Tag Archives: R.M. Chisholm

Some Boring MetaBlogging

Number 14 of this pretty much describes what I am trying to do here.  In particular:

…you can work around the edges of an idea over days and weeks and months [and years] and really come to understand it. It’s this process that blogging does better than pretty much any other medium.

This is what I am trying to do with the Relevant Logic/Material Implication/Information Theory viewed through the eyes of Fred Dretske stuff (repeated endlessly).  Who knows, I might even do some endless blogging someday to gain a ‘maximal grasp’ (Merleau-Ponty) on the Roderick Chisholm stuff.


A Doubtlessly Lame Attempt At Explaining The Awkwardness

Caution:  The following belongs to the category of ‘let’s see how long I can get away with this before it convincingly gets shot down’.  Either that, or to the category ‘This is so obvious and has been stated so many times in the past that it is a puzzle why you bother mentioning it.’

The motivation for the following blather:  In a previous post I was bothered by the (I think true) assertion that one can reduce propositions to states of affairs…my botheration arising from the fact that while propositions are always either true or false, it seems awkward to say things like “Don’s standing to the right of Genghis Khan is a true state of affairs.”

The blather itself:  Let’s suppose that we could describe a state of affairs as either true state of affairs, or a false state of affairs, using the ‘state of affairs’ vocabulary, only if any state of affairs could be so described.  Not every state of affairs can be described as either true or false:  for example, “Guile riding his bicycle.”  This is a state of affairs that occurs at any given moment, when Guile is riding his bicycle at that moment, or that fails to occur at that moment; but it is neither true nor false.

So if we try to describe “Guile rode his bicycle a moment ago in Angeles” as a true (or false) state of affairs, we will be beating our head against the wall, for we will be using a vocabulary that cannot be applied to any state of affairs, but only to some of them.  So instead of beating our head against a brick wall, we will invent a new kind of thing:  propositions, which are either true or false.  And we will reduce propositions to states of affairs by saying propositions are nothing but a subset of the set of states of affairs, namely, those that always occur (or fail to occur).  (“Guile rode his bicycle a moment ago, i.e., at time t_1, in Angeles” is a state of affairs that will always occur if Guile did ride his bicycle during that time and at that place, or it is a state of affairs that will never occur.)

Conclusion:  This way we can reduce propositions to a subset of states of affairs without having to talk about true or false states of affairs.

My homage to Plato’s SYMPOSIUM for this post is Brad Pitt again:


How can anyone get anything done with beauty like that walking the earth?