Oddly enough for those of us used to thinking of Berkeley as a thoroughgoing idealist, Berkeley maintains in his AN ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF VISION a direct realism regarding tactile perception. Whereas the objects of vision — for example, the visible moon — do not exist outside the mind, the objects of touch — what is touched, tangible objects — do exist outside the mind in external space. As George Pitcher puts it, speaking of what Berkeley is claiming in black and white in the NEW THEORY OF VISION:
What we feel are the tangible objects — i.e., the objects that are spread around us at various points in physical space. What we see are objects that exist only in the mind.
George Pitcher, BERKELEY: THE ARGUMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHERS (Routledge, London and New York), p. 28. Henceforth BERKELEY
Tangible objects, in the system of the Essay, exist around us in real physical space.
George Pitcher, BERKELEY, p. 43.
And from the Master himself:
For all visible things are equally in the Mind, and take up no part of the external Space. And consequently are equidistant [in the next sentence Berkeley says ‘Or rather to speak truly…are at no Distance, neither near nor far…] from any tangible thing, which exists without the Mind.
George Berkeley, AN ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF VISION, paragraphs CXI and CXII, in The GEORGE BERKELEY COLLECTION: 5 CLASSIC WORKS, Amazon Print-On-Demand Edition, no pagination. Henceforth A NEW THEORY OF VISION.
Perceiving for Berkeley (I will venture now…though I may end up chipping away at this claim) is always a two-place relation between a Mind that perceives something and the thing that is perceived. In the case of vision, this relation is for Berkeley a two-place relation between the Mind and an entity that exists only in the mind, a visual Idea. In the case of touch, this relation is a two-place relation between the Mind and a hard or soft or rough or smooth or sharp or rounded…object existing in external space (or at least this is what Berkeley cares to state explicitly in black and white in his NEW THEORY OF VISION.)
In the case of vision, I perceive extra-mental object existing in external space only indirectly, or mediately, in a three-place relation between my Mind (me), the Visibile Idea (e.g., the Visibile Moon) to which my Mind is related directly, and the external object (the physical, tangible Moon) for which the Visibile Moon serves as a sign. So with regard to vision, Berkeley maintains (at least in what he sets down in black and white on the page) a representational theory of perception. He is an indirect realist with regard to vision: we see the physical object in external space just indirectly, in a way mediated by the mental object of color and shape that we do see directly.
But with regard to touch, Berkeley is a direct realist. We perceive the physical object directly through touch. We don’t perceive it by ‘touching’ or ‘feeling’ a mental object that represents the physical tangible object. We are in contact with the object itself. Put another way, our perception reaches all the way to the felt object. In the case of touch, the perception is a two-place, not a three-place relation.
This direct realism in the case of touch comes as a bit of a surprise to those of us who think of Berkeley as a thoroughgoing idealist who thinks that everything is mental. And in fact Berkeley apparently claimed in later writings that he theorized touch this way only to prevent his readers from freaking out from far too much counterintuitive idealism (Pitcher, BERKELEY, p. 28) which would only have served to distract his readers from what he wanted to focus on, namely, vision. In his own thoughts, ostensibly kept to himself at the time of A NEW THEORY OF VISION, he regarded the objects of touch as in fact mental. But regardless of what the historical George Berkeley thought or did not think inwardly as he wrote that tract, treating touch in a direct realist fashion as involving direct perceptual contact with the touched/felt physical object is strongly motivated by how he conceptualizes the (ostensibly just mental) objects of vision.
As I have discussed in a previous post, The Truth Of Bishop Berkeley (Part 0), Berkeley treats the visible object has properties. The Visibile Moon, for example, is round, flat, luminous, and of a certain pale cheese-like yellow. If we think of the objects of touch as having analogous properties, those properties would be rough, smooth, hard, soft, and so on. But surely no mental things can be rough etc. Only physical objects — for example, the bark of a tree, the cool smoothness of marble — can have these properties. Thus conceptualizing Ideas as having properties puts Berkeley straightway on the road to regarding physical objects existing in extra-mental space as the objects of touch.
Touch lends itself to a direct realist interpretation in a way that vision does not. The seen object at least seems to be at a distance from the sensing surface of the see-er. How can the visual experience include anything at a distance from this sensing surface? It would seem prima facie that anything away from that surface would have to be outside the experience. The visual experience would therefore be confronted with the impossible-to-fulfill need to “reach out” to the seen object. This, at least, is how I try to articulate the intuition that vision poses a problem for a direct realist interpretation of the seen object.
By contrast, there is zero distance between the sensing surface of my skin and the rough bark of the tree as I run my hand along the bark’s surface. Through touch, I am in contact with the physical object itself. There is no question of the tactile experience having to “reach out” to the object because a physical me, engaging my physical hand, has already done the reaching out. Touch is the direct realist sense par excellence.
And, as I hope to show (soon, or at least sometime before I die), the visual experience actually does reach out (in some sense of ‘actually does reach out’) to the physical object (Merleau-Ponty), or at least seems to so reach out (Berkeley) because of the way touch is implicated in the visual experience. Touch informs the direct realist character (real or ostensible) of visual experience.
This time my homage to Plato’s SYMPOSIUM takes the form of Brad Pitt in THE FIGHT CLUB. This image seems appropriate for a disquisition on touch and brutal physical reality.
If Plato can have a thing for Alkibiades, I can have a thing for gorgeous rednecks. This particular redneck needs to stop smoking, however.