Category Archives: Semantics

Just For The Fun Of It: A Quibble With C.J. Date

In the previous post, I said “I get the funny feeling that for him [C.J. Date] a sentence or expression functions normally at first, but when he stares at it too long it suddenly loses its transparency….”  Here I want to unpack that doubtlessly cryptic statement a bit.  I am doing this as a kind of finger-exercise, mainly for the fun of it, and not necessarily because it will help resolve some important issue.

In “SOME OPERATORS ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS”, the second chapter of his LOGIC AND DATABASES:  THE ROOTS OF RELATIONAL THEORY, C.J. Date introduces the names NAME(‘TRUE’) and NAME(‘FALSE’) to use as symbols for BOOLEAN(NAME(‘TRUE’) ) and BOOLEAN(NAME(‘FALSE’)).  He doesn’t use, of course, the selectors I am using (to avoid ambiguity); instead, he mentions the names.  That is to say, he is talking about the symbols TRUE and FALSE.  All  page references will be to LOGIC AND DATABASES:

If p is a proposition, it has a truth value.  For the purposes of  this chapter, if p is true, I’ll denote its truth value by TRUE; it it’s false, I’ll denote its truth value by FALSE.  In computing terms, we might say we have a data type called BOOLEAN that contains just these two truth values, and the literal representations of those values are TRUE and FALSE, respectively.

(p. 42)

Then for a moment, he uses the symbols to talk about the truth values themselves.  For a moment, the symbols stop being the things seen, and function transparently as windows through which we see the things denoted.  But, feeling conflicted,  he immediately labels his use of the symbols as a kind of perhaps-understandable confusion:

We might also say, more simply but less accurately, that the legal values of type BOOLEAN just are TRUE and FALSE; strictly speaking, however, TRUE and FALSE aren’t values as such — rather, they’re literals, or symbols, that denote certain values, just as, e.g., the numeral 3 isn’t a number as such but rather a literal, or symbol (more colloquially, a digit or numeral) that denotes a certain number.

(p. 42)

But no, when ‘TRUE’ and ‘FALSE’ are being used to denote truth values, it is perfectly accurate to say that the legal values of type BOOLEAN just are TRUE and FALSE.  Likewise, when ‘3’ is being used to denote a number, 3 is a number as such.  It is as if Date were peering through the symbol-as-window, so to speak, letting it perform its function of letting us see the thing the symbol denotes….when, all of a sudden, the window going all milkily opaque on him, all he sees is the now suddenly non-transparent glass.  It is as if he said, first, ‘Cleopatra was a Ptolemaic ruler of Egypt’, but then immediately felt the need to correct himself and say, ‘Well, this is a bit inaccurate, since the name ‘Cleopatra’ wasn’t a Ptolemaic ruler of Egypt’.

Similarly, Date is brought up short when he sees the expressions x + 4 and 2x – 1 in the equation x + 4 = 2x – 1:

But the trouble is, we use the symbol “=” to mean other things as well — other things, that is, in addition to identity as such….  By way of illustration, consider the following equation:

x + 4 = 2x -1

The symbol x here is meant to denote some number, and it’s easy to see by solving the equation that the number in question is five.  But the expressions on the two sides of the “=” symbol are self-evidently not identical:  that is, the “=” symbol here does not denote identity.  Rather, it is the values denoted by the expressions on the two sides of the “=” symbol that are identical.

(p. 45)

But the “=”, rather, MATH_CONSTANT(‘=’), does denote identity, because the expressions are being used to denote the number that each expression resolves to, given the expression on the other side.  The expressions are not being mentioned — for example, the author of the equation is not talking about the fact that each expression contains the symbol ‘x‘ and references at least one number.   ‘x + 4′ names a quantity when made resolvable by equating it with ‘2x – 1′, and vice versa.   MATH_VARIABLE(‘x’) MATH_OPERATOR(‘+’) NUMBER(NUMERAL(‘4’)) MATH_CONSTANT(‘=’) NUMBER(NUMERAL(‘2’)) MATH_OPERATOR(‘*’) MATH_VARIABLE(‘x) MATH_OPERATOR(‘-‘) NUMBER(NUMERAL(‘1’)).  The quantity named by the one expression is identical with the quantity named by the other expression.  The hermeneutical principle of charity compels us to interpret the expressions this way:  otherwise, we don’t get a symbol “=” that means something other than identity; instead, we simply get a blatantly false statement when there is an absurdly easy path to getting a true statement.

Not so, then, that “…we use the symbol ‘=’ to mean other things as well — other things, that is, in addition to identity as such…”  It is used to mean just identity. It would continue to denote identity even if, perversely, we chose to mention the expressions instead of using them, for we would end up with, not a true statement that relied on a different meaning of ‘=’, but with a false statement using ‘=’ to denote identity.  Notice that I am not exercising enough control here to avoid vacillating between using single quotation marks and double quotation marks to indicate I am talking about the symbol for the equals constant.

In spite of saying a number of false things on the way towards his conclusion, it’s hard to argue with that conclusion:   But saying this does not commit me to asserting that nothing is subtly wrong with it. I am too lazy now to try to dig and see if there is a subtle, non-obvious but not necessarily unimportant way in which Date is going wrong here; and anything I came up with would probably seem rather scholastic anyhow.

To sum up:  Equality means identity.  An expression of the form x = y is almost always shorthand for one of the form value_of(x) = value_of(y).

(p. 47)

Except I would add that even in the case of expression(x) = expression(y) — for example, ‘2x -1′ = ‘2x – 1′, equality also means identity.

We can perhaps forgive Date for using (with whatever qualms) one moment the symbol as a window through which he sees the thing denoted, but seeing the next moment nothing but a window become thoroughly milky and completely opaque.  For ordinary language can start out using a name, then shift mid-stream to mentioning the same occurrence of the name by the time one gets to the middle of the sentence.  I think the example is Quine’s:

Giorgione was so called because of his size.

And on that note, I will show one of Giorgione’s paintings:

300px-Giorgione_019

and since we are now on the topic of beauty, I will go all Plato’s SYMPOSIUM on my few (0, 1, 2…) readers:

936full-a-river-runs-through-it-screenshot

Maganda si Brad Pit.  Being that gorgeous should be illegal.  I will attempt to say that in Tagalog this way:  Dapat ilegal ang magiging ganoong maganda, but that is almost certainly either ungrammatical or unidiomatic (hindi pangwikian).  Perhaps someone with better Tagalog may correct me.

Update:  12/18/2012:  Made various corrections.

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Semantic vs. Syntactic Arguments

In a previous post, playing the role of a would-be ordinary-language philosopher working in Tagalog (which language, to the the total consternation and perplexity of the Spanish grammarians during the 1600s, lacks the verb ‘to be’), I tried to provoke the suspicion that there is no single relation IS that could be pictured as follows:

IS (0)
THING PROPERTY
NUMBER( NAME(‘3’) ) PROPERTY( NAME(‘Prime’) )
CAR( NAME(‘Car With Serial Number 1235813’) ) PROPERTY( NAME(‘Red’) )
FLOWER( NAME (‘Rose With Barcode 3185321’) ) PROPERTY( NAME(‘Beautiful’) )
MINERAL_ITEM( NAME(‘Grain Of Salt Mentioned By Hegel’) ) PROPERTY( NAME(‘Cubical’) )
MINERAL_ITEM( NAME(‘Grain Of Salt Mentioned By Hegel’) ) PROPERTY( NAME(‘White’) )

Contra John Duns Scotus, for example, there is no single relation ‘contracts’ holding between a universal existing as always-already contracted into a particular. (To back up for a moment, the property denoted by NAME(‘three-sided’)is the universal denoted by NAME(‘three-sidedness’)existing as already contracted into a particular triangle.) Nor is there any other single relation which we can identify with the verb ‘is’. Or … letting my Tagalog ordinary-language suspicions run wild for the moment … so I will suppose.

There is no semantic relation (we are supposing) between the particular thing and the particular property.  But there is a syntactic relation between two names, pictured as follows;

IS (0)
THING PROPERTY
NAME(‘3’) NAME(‘Prime’)
NAME(‘Car With Serial Number 1235813’) NAME(‘Red’)
NAME(‘Rose With Barcode 3185321’) NAME(‘Beautiful’)
NAME(‘Grain Of Salt Mentioned By Hegel’) NAME(‘Cubical’)
NAME(‘Grain Of Salt Mentioned By Hegel’) NAME(‘White’)

Voila:  here is the distinction between semantic vs. syntactical arguments to a verb aka predicate that puzzled me in an earlier post.  NAME(‘3’) and NAME(‘Prime’) are syntactic predicates to the verb/predicate ‘is’.  NUMBER( NAME(‘3’) ) and PROPERTY( NAME(‘Prime’) ) are the semantic predicates to the verb ‘is’ — or would be if there were such a verb ‘is’ that took semantic arguments.

In the spirit of ‘let’s see how long I can get away with this’, let me propose the following chain of events for verbs such as eats that do take semantic arguments.  Consider a relation like the one pictured here:

EATS (0)
NAME_OF_PERSON_EATING NAME_OF_FOOD_ITEM_BEING_EATEN
NAME(‘Joe’) NAME(‘This egg’)
NAME(‘Khadija’) NAME(‘This souffle’)
NAME(‘Juan’) NAME(‘This fajita’)
NAME(‘Kha’) NAME(‘This bowl of Pho’)
NAME(‘Cliff’) NAME(‘This plate of Thai food with a 5-star Thai-spicy rating’)

When used in ordinary discourse, rather than mentioned as sentences with whatever syntactic properties, these tuples with their syntactic arguments get transformed into the following tuples with their semantic arguments:

EATS (0)
PERSON_EATING FOOD_ITEM_BEING_EATEN
PERSON( NAME(‘Joe’) ) FOOD_ITEM( NAME(‘This egg’) )
PERSON( NAME(‘Khadija’) ) FOOD_ITEM( NAME(‘This souffle’) )
PERSON( NAME(‘Juan’) ) FOOD_ITEM( NAME(‘This fajita’) )
PERSON( NAME(‘Kha’) ) FOOD_ITEM( NAME(‘This bowl of Pho’) )
PERSON( NAME(‘Cliff’) ) FOOD_ITEM( NAME(‘This plate of Thai food with a 5-star Thai-spicy rating’) )

If we think of the intransitive and transitive verbs ‘eats’ as really being the same verb on the semantic level (though it is not clear to me that they are the same), ‘Joe eats’ would be ‘Joe eats something’.  We can derive the corresponding tuple from  the EATS relation first by projecting on the attribute PERSON_EATING:

EATS(1)
PERSON_EATING FOOD_ITEM_EATEN
PERSON( NAME(‘Joe’) ) FOOD_ITEM( NAME(‘This egg’) )
PERSON( NAME(‘Khadija’) ) FOOD_ITEM( NAME(‘This souffle’) )
PERSON( NAME(‘Juan’) ) FOOD_ITEM( NAME(‘This fajita’) )
PERSON( NAME(‘Kha’) ) FOOD_ITEM( NAME(‘This bowl of Pho’) )
PERSON( NAME(‘Cliff’) ) FOOD_ITEM( NAME(‘This plate of Thai food with a 5-star Thai-spicy rating’) )

Then by doing a RESTRICT on Joe:

EATS(2)
PERSON_EATING FOOD_ITEM_EATEN
PERSON( NAME(‘Joe’) ) FOOD_ITEM( NAME(‘This egg’) )
PERSON( NAME(‘Khadija’) ) FOOD_ITEM( NAME(‘This souffle’) )
PERSON( NAME(‘Juan’) ) FOOD_ITEM( NAME(‘This fajita’) )
PERSON( NAME(‘Kha’) ) FOOD_ITEM( NAME(‘This bowl of Pho’) )
PERSON( NAME(‘Cliff’) ) FOOD_ITEM( NAME(‘This plate of Thai food with a 5-star Thai-spicy rating’) )

The existence of verbs that are sometimes transitive, sometimes intransitive  is what motivated Santorini’s distinction between semantic and syntactic arguments to a verb.

Although I have labored over making this distinction for an embarrassing amount of time, it becomes quite easy to make once one has the notion of a SELECTOR available as a conceptual tool.

I’d like to mention as a final note that possibly we should think of the arguments of eats as always already nested inside the selectors PERSON and FOOD_ITEM; in other words, the names are always transparent, so to speak, letting us see through them the persons and food items, the semantic arguments, named.  It is only under special circumstances — say when the transparent denoting function of the sentence breaks down … maybe one has been staring at the sentence for too long — that the selectors PERSON and FOOD_ITEM get stripped away and we see the names, the syntactic arguments, doing the denoting.  (The sentences always seem to be breaking down this way for C.J. Date in his article “SOME OPERATORS ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS” in his LOGIC AND DATABASES:  THE ROOTS OF RELATIONAL THEORY.  I get the funny feeling that for him a sentence or expression functions normally at first, but when he stares at it too long it suddenly loses its transparency and becomes an opaque relation between names.  See pages 42 and 45, and see if you get the same impression.)  This final note has been brought to you by the balefully compromised spirit of Martin Heidegger, which was nagging me as I wrote the above.

And now, in the spirit of Plato’s SYMPOSIUM, I would like to picture something a little less dry than the pictures of Relations shown above.  Today it is Kellan Lutz who is serving as my stepping stone, first, to the Relational Algebra, then, finally, to the form of Beauty itself:

Kellan_Lutz

(Rapturous sigh.  How can one live in this world when there is so much beauty in it?)

Update 12/16/2012:  Corrected some errors in the names of some of the Relations; tried to improve the flow of the writing.


Selectors And Semantic vs. Syntactic Arguments

In case anyone wonders (“feel free to come to the point when you finally decide what it is”), the point of the following ramblings is to arrive at a place where I can make a distinction between semantic arguments and syntactic arguments.  The point of making this distinction will become clear (or not) in a later post.  Making the distinction is part of my attempting to put in my own words the argument that Tagalog lacks a subject.

In the previous post, I argued (or claimed, or made the completely unsupported, nay, spurious assertion, as the case may be) that the semantics of Maganda si Robert Pattinson can also be given by the following statement in the database language Tutorial D:

GORGEOUS_EQUALS_GORGEOUS{THIS_ONE, THAT_ONE} where THIS_ONE = PERSON(NAME(‘Robert Pattinson’))

This statement includes the Selector PERSON(NAME(‘Robert Pattinson’)).  Let me unpack a bit what this is. Before I start, I’d like to point out that I THINK that it is  legal in Tutorial D to nest one selector inside another…

NAME(‘Robert Pattinson’) is a operator or function that takes the string ‘Robert Pattinson’ and selects one and only one name.  I will take the concept ‘selects’ as primitive here.  Any implementation of this selector in a physical computer would involve shuffling around ones and zeros until the computer spits out, i.e., returns, one member of the set NAME.  NAME would include strings, but subject to certain limitations.  For example, I assume a  name would have to be, at least, less than 1 billion characters long.  NAME would also include more than strings (that is, representations of text):  a name can be selected by a sound.  So NAME(<<some representation of a sound>>) could also select the name Robert Pattinson. (The reader will notice that I have not yet decided on how to represent, in the absence of a formal selector, a name as opposed to a string as opposed to the person himself…)

PERSON(NAME(Robert Pattinson)) would take the name selected by NAME(‘Robert Pattinson’) and return a member of the set PERSONS, i.e., Robert Pattinson himself.  I don’t know how a computer would implement this operator, but a human being would be implementing that operator in the following type of circumstance:  say, I am sitting in a restaurant.  Someone in the table next to me says:

 I hereby officially declare myself to belong to Team Edward because Robert Pattinson is just too gorgeous.

One part of that utterance, the part that I hear as the word ‘Robert Pattinson’, is the end point of a long causal chain that begins, say, when the parents of Robert Pattinson, after endless wrangling and indecision, finally agree to call their baby ‘Robert’; the doctor in the Maternity Ward crosses out the ‘baby boy’ in ‘baby boy Pattinson’ and writes in  ‘Robert’ on the birth certificate (call this the ‘baptismal event’) … endless events … a director or producer chooses the person named by ‘Robert Pattinson’ to play Edward Cullen in TWILIGHT … endless events…the person sitting at the table next to me sees TWILIGHT…he reads in a magazine he buys at the supermarket that Robert Pattinson played the part of Edward Cullen…he emits a set of soundwaves at the table next to me, which in turn trigger God-only-knows what processes in my brain, until I hear ‘…Robert Pattinson….’  That entire causal chain, ending up in the wetware of my brain, selects the person Robert Pattinson.  THAT’s the implementation of the selector PERSON(NAME(<<some representation of certain sound waves>>)).  Speaking metaphorically and a bit picturesquely, the selector spits out, or returns, Robert Pattinson himself, the flesh-and-blood Robert Pattinson who lives in (I would say ‘Valencia, California’, but that is where Taylor Lautner lives)…. Speaking literally, the selector selects Robert Pattinson himself.

(See Saul Kripke, who apparently never explicitly endorsed this causal theory of reference aka selection.  Gareth Evans would apparently deem this theory, as stated by me, to be naive, but it seems perfectly intuitive to me.)

Invocations of selectors produce literals (more accurately, I guess, are literals).  So whatever else Robert Pattinson himself may be, he is a literal value.

Let me take the liberty of allowing selector invocations as arguments supplied to the parameters of functions, so that we can replace x with the argument PERSON(NAME(‘Robert Pattinson’)) in the function x EQUALS x to produce a true proposition.  Below, I have identified, ala Chisholm, propositions with states of affairs in the world:  here, with Robert Pattinson being identical with Robert Pattinson.  This proposition gives us the semantics of the utterance “Robert Pattinson equals Robert Pattinson.”

I will therefore call the invocation of PERSON(NAME(‘Robert Pattinson’)) a semantic argument.  By contrast, the invocation of NAME(‘Robert Pattinson’), occuring inside an utterance, spoken or written, is a syntactic argument.  In this way, I make sense of the semantic arguments vs. syntactic arguments distinction I puzzled over in a previous post.

I do not know, of course, whether this is the distinction that Beatrice Santorini wanted to make.

I will end by making another homage to Plato’s SYMPOSIUM, according to which interest in Robert Pattinson, Taylor Lautner, Kellan Lutz et al ultimately leads to interest in the Relational Algebra, and from there, to the Form of Beauty itself:

Robert_Pattinson_2

Wow, I love that slightly-unshaven look…(the reader may  hear a rapturous sigh…)

Now, having briefly lapsed into a lower form of eros, I will go back to eros for the Relational Algebra in connection with Semantics….

Update:  After hitting the publish button, I saw this quote from the first Jewish Prime Minister of Great Britain:

The best way to become acquainted with a subject is to write a book about it.

Benjamin Disraeli

Or blog about it at length.


Some Gorgeous One Equals Robert Pattinson

Below, I have argued that (or, more accurately, attempted to provoke the Aha Erlebniss that)  the following three Tagalog sentences:

Titser ang babae.

Maganda ang lalaki.

Umalis ang babae.

…have as their most literal translation something like the following:

Some teacher one  equals the woman.

Some gorgeous one equals the man.

Some having left one equals the woman.

How would these sentences be expressed in the Relational Algebra?  Let me try to express “Some beautiful one equals Robert Pattinson” (I am switching from Team Jacob to Team Edward for the moment) in the Relational Algebra.  (Notice I am switching from ‘the man’ to ‘Robert Pattinson’.  Can I get away with this?)

A relation is a set of ordered pairs formed by taking the Cartesian Product of two sets, not necessarily distinct, and obtaining a subset (possibly identical with the entire set) of the set of ordered pairs.  Let’s form a particular EQUALS relation, GORGEOUS_EQUALS_GORGEOUS, by taking the Cartesian Product of the set GORGEOUS with the set GORGEOUS, then take from that Product the set of all those ordered pairs in which each member of the pair is identical with the other.  So that the relation can be more easily manipulated (conceptually), add in all the stuff necessary to turn this relation into a database relation, complete with tuples and attributes and all that good stuff.

GORGEOUS_EQUALS_GORGEOUS(0)
THIS_ONE THAT_ONE
Robert Pattinson Robert Pattinson
Taylor Lautner Taylor Lautner
Kellan Lutz Kellan Lutz
Brad Pitt Brad Pitt
Ashton Kutchner Ashton Kutchner

Restrict GORGEOUS_EQUALS_GORGEOUS to just the Robert Pattinson tuple:

GORGEOUS_EQUALS_GORGEOUS{THIS_ONE, THAT_ONE} where THIS_ONE = PERSON(NAME(‘Robert Pattinson’))
More attention needs to be paid to the literal selector PERSON(NAME(‘Robert Pattinson’)).  Will my worries about this, unarticulated here, eventually blow up in my face?

To get the relation pictured by:

GORGEOUS_EQUALS_GORGEOUS(1a)
THIS_ONE THAT_ONE
Robert Pattinson Robert Pattinson

Now project on the attribute THAT_ONEi in addition to performing the RESTRICT:

GORGEOUS_EQUALS_GORGEOUS{THAT_ONE} where THIS_ONE = NAME(‘Robert Pattinson’)

To get the relation pictured by:

GORGEOUS_EQUALS_GORGEOUS(1)
THAT_ONE
Robert Pattinson

(Imagine the surrounding white space as regnant with the matrix from which this relation sprints, namely, the base relation GORGEOUS_EQUALS_GORGEOUS.)

The above relation expresses the proposition that is also expressed in English as:

Some gorgeous one equals Robert Pattinson.

and that is also expressed in Tagalog, I claim, as:

Maganda si Robert Pattinson.

So:

Maganda si Robert Pattinson.

Some gorgous one equals Robert Pattinson

have the same semantics.  (Well, would have the exact same semantics if ‘gorgeous’ were exactly equivalent to ‘maganda’, which of course may be doubtful.)

Now, in the spirit of Plato’s Symposium (eros for gorgeous  young men inspires eros for the Relational Algebra and the Predicate Logic, and from there to the Form of Beauty itself), let me picture some of the members of that set which inspires my forays into the Relational Algebra.  These pictures are a bit more colorful than the pictures of relations shown above.

Do I really have to choose between Team Edward and Team Jacob?

12/04/2012:  Updated to remove problematic assertions about the semantics of ‘is’.


The Mystery Of The Missing IS: Or, Had John Duns Scotus Been An Ordinary-Language Philosopher Working In Tagalog


Below, I have tried to start incubating the suspicion that there is something fishy about treating ‘is’ as a predicate with two parameters accepting one argument each, i.e., a two-place relation.


Tagalog doesn’t have a verb ‘is’, no verb ‘to be’.  Given that more literal translations of Tagalog sentences often display the phrase ang noun phrase structure as:

 

phrase [is] ang noun phrase


For example:

Titser ang babae.

Maganda ang lalaki.

Umalis ang babae.

gets rendered as:

Teacher [is] the woman.

Beautiful [is] the man.

Having left [is] the woman.

or as I prefer (see my attempt below at eliciting the ‘aha erlebniss’):

Some teacher one  [is] the woman.

Some beautiful one [is] the man.

Some having left one [is] the woman.

…given that, one might think that, always, the suspect verb aka predicate aka relation is implicitly in effect in sentences with that structure.  The lack of a verb ‘to be’, of an ‘is’ in Tagalog that so perplexed the first Spanish grammarians of the language (so that, in their total confusion and lack of understanding, they tried to interpret the Tagalog inversion marker ‘ay‘ as the verb ‘is’, a confusion and misinterpretation that has had hilarious consequences lasting to this day), is always there, just unpronounced (or unwritten).  The space between ‘maganda‘ and ‘ang lalaki‘ in the written sentence, or the lack of interruption in the string of sounds (if that is how maganda ang lalaki gets pronounced — I am not strong enough presently in Tagalog to know) or the glottal interruption (if one exists between the ‘maganda‘ and ‘ang lalaki‘)  … the space, or lack of interruption in the continuous stream of sound, or the glottal, these are, as the case may be, an implicit sign of the two-place relation ‘is’.

Following Naylor, Schachter, and my own intuition, I have been treating the space, the lack of interruption in the continuous stream of sound, the glottal as an implicit equals.  For example, I prefer to translate the above three Tagalog sentences as:

Some teacher one  = the woman.

Some beautiful one = the man.

Some having left one = the woman.

Unlike ‘is’, however, which is (if there is such a critter) a two-place relation, ‘equals’ (alternatively, ‘=’ ) is, as I am about to show, a one place relation.  It is not just that the sign corresponding to ‘is’ is lacking in Tagalog:  the (real or putative) semantics of ‘is’ is lacking in Tagalog as well.  Tagalog is working with something completely different.

Clearly the ‘equals’ that is in play here is not given by the ‘equals’ in the following two-place relation:

 

THISTHAT

EQUALS (0)
Morning Star Evening Star
3 3
Rose With Barcode 3185321 Rose With Barcode 3185321
Clifford Wirt Clifford Wirt
The murderer of Jones The butler

…because in sentences such as Maganda si Taylor Lautner, the word ‘Maganda’  does not, at the moment of its utterance, specify, identify, locate, expose, or pick out any one particular thing.   ‘Maganda’ is equivalent to ‘Some beautiful one’, or the part of the formal sentence below that occurs before the ‘=’:

∃x ∈ MAGANDA: x = si Taylor Lautner.

The x that belongs to the set MAGANDA is left unspecified, unidentified, unlocated, unexposed, un-picked-out at the start:  Maganda … though it does get specified at the end:  …si Taylor Lautner.  But a two-place relation requires two identified, specified arguments for its two attributes.

Let me try to capture in D the sentence ‘∃x ∈ MAGANDA: x = si Taylor Lautner’.  Let me posit the following 1-place relation:


MAGANDA (0)
MAGANDANG_BAGAY
Taylor Lautner
Sunset at time t and place p
Rose With Barcode 3185321
Wine Red
The Taj Mahal
Haendel’s Umbra Mai Fu

Taking this relation as my springboard, I capture ∃x ∈ MAGANDA as MAGANDA{} (which gives us TABLE_DEE, or TRUE, or YES), then do a CARTESIAN PRODUCT of that with a restriction of MAGANDA:

with
MAGANDA{} as t_sub_0,
MAGANDA{MAGANDANG_BAGAY} where   MAGANDANG_BAGAY= ‘Taylor    Lautner’ as t_sub_1:
t_sub_0 X t_sub_1

CARTESIAN PRODUCT is a special case of JOIN.  TABLE_DEE JOIN r, where r is any relation, yields r.  So the D statement above yields:

MAGANDA (1)
MAGANDANG_BAGAY
Taylor Lautner

which expresses the semantics of the sentence ‘Maganda si Taylor Lautner’.  In this way, we get rid of the doubtful (I think) verb aka two-place relation ‘is’.

To sum up, a bit impishly:  the semantics of ‘is’ is different in Tagalog than in English because Tagalog really doesn’t have an ‘is’.  Later, I will try to develop this into part of an argument that Tagalog lacks a subject.  Tagalog’s lacking a verb ‘to be’ is related to its lacking a subject.

To stray back for a moment to philosophy:  were Duns Scotus an ordinary-language philosopher working in Tagalog, it may never have occurred to him to try to find a single relation (e.g. ‘contracts’ ) between the entity Beauty, as the argument on one side of the predicate ‘is’, and Taylor Lautner as the argument on the other side of the predicate, and so on for every other proposition formed by supplying arguments to the parameters x and y in the predicate x is y.

11/10/2012:  Updated to make a point a bit more clearly.

11/10/2012:  Updated to parenthetically add some snark about the first Spanish grammarians of the Tagalog language in the 1600’s.

 

Update:  11/25/2012:  Post grayed-out because I am dissatisfied with it.


Predicates And Semantic Roles

The type named in the heading of a relation would typically have to be defined partly in terms of a Semantic Role.  In the Relation INVITES, for example, the person inviting belongs to the set INVITERS, which is a subset of AGENTS, i.e., the set of entities capable of acting volitionally.  AGENTS is in turn is a subset of ACTORS.  An entity belongs to ACTORS when, although not necessarily capable of volition, it “… in some intuitive way performs, effects, or controls the situation.”  (I’ve lost track of the source.)  In turn, the person invited belongs to the set INVITEES, which is a subset of PATIENTS, entities acted upon.

INVITES (0)
INVITER INVITEE
Andrew Chris
Andrew David
Brian Eddie

Agents, Actors, and Patients are all, of course, Semantic Roles.


The Predicate Returns A Relation

We have seen that the predicate:

x is to the left of y

is mapped to the truth value TRUE when Charles is substituted for x and Genghis Khan is substituted for y.  The Relation TO_THE_LEFT_OF comprises all true propositions and only true propositions that get generated when values are substituted for x and y.  So the predicate is a function whose range is the truth value TRUE for every proposition that is included in the relation, and FALSE for every proposition that is not included in the relation.

I think, however, that we would get a slightly simpler account if we see the predicate as a function returning Relations comprising the single proposition TRUE, or the single proposition FALSE.  In the Relational Algebra, we would get a relation comprising the single tuple (and therefore proposition) TRUE if, after doing the Restriction that gives us:

Charles is to the left of Genghis Khan.

we then projected on the null set of attributes (“columns”).  We would then end up with Chris Date’s TABLE_DEE, that is, the Relation with cardinality 0 (o attributes, that is, 0 “columns”) and a single tuple.  TABLE_DEE is the Relation that corresponds to (I guess I should say ‘is identical with’) the weird classical logic proposition TRUE.  The predicate returns the proposition TRUE wrapped in the Relation TABLE_DEE when the Charles and Genghis Khan substitution is made.

Correspondingly, when John is substituted for x and Genghis Khan is subsituted for y, so that we get:

John is to the left of Genghis Khan.

the Restriction selects no tuple in the Relation TO_THE_LEFT_OF.  We then have a Derived Relation with a cardinality of 2 (i.e., the Relation has 2 “columns”) holding the null set of tuples.   If we then project on the null set of attributes, we end up with a Relation of cardinality 0 comprising 0 tuples.  Chris Date calls this Relation TABLE_DUM, and it holds the tuple, that is to say, the proposition FALSE.  The predicate returns the proposition FALSE wrapped in the Relation TABLE_DUM when the John and Genghis Khan substitution is made.

Thinking of the predicate as returning either TABLE_DEE or TABLE_DUM simplifies things a bit, because it means we never have to leave the Relational Algebra when modeling the predicate.  Everything gets explained in terms of just one set of operations, the operations of the Relational Algebra.