Category Archives: Argument That Tagalog Lacks A Subject

Re-Igniting An Old Flame

A few weeks ago my interest in the French Philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) suddenly got re-ignited upon finding out that a paper I published in a previous life (THE CONCEPT OF THE ECSTASIS, Journal Of The British Society For Phenomenology, 14(1):  79-90, 1983) actually got listed in the bibliography of Stephen Priest’s MERLEAU-PONTY:  THE ARGUMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHERS.

The sudden explosion of this renewed interest is a bit like the result of throwing a lighted match on a bunch of rags soaked in gasoline.  In its heat, I’ve decided to start a new category of blog posts comprising an attempt to gain a deeper, fuller understanding of the topic of that paper.  What positions stated in the paper do I still hold?  What positions must I mark to market?  (<yes I am being ironic>Doubtlessly none — surely my paper is sacred text.</yes I am being ironic>) What can be stated more clearly, argued for more carefully?  Doing this kind of thing is what blogs are ideal for:

…you can work around the edges of an idea over days and weeks and months [and years] and really   come to understand it. It’s this process that blogging does better than pretty much any other medium.

Anil Dash On Blogging


The topic of my paper is, essentially:

The question concerning corporeity connects also with Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on space (l’espace) and the primacy of the dimension of depth (la profondeur) as implied in the notion of being in the world (être au monde; to echo Heidegger’s In-der-Welt-sein) and of one’s own body (le corps propre).

Wikipedia Article On Maurice Merleau-Ponty


So in the months and years to come I will be re-reading, working through, and blogging on Merleau-Ponty (THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION, THE VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE, and other works) in order to really come to understand, truly get my head around, get a maximal grasp of this notion of ‘the primacy of the dimension of depth as implied in the notion of being in the world and of one’s own body.’  As part of this effort, I will be re-reading and blogging on George Berkeley’s works as well, which, partly as foil, partly in a kind of concurrence, shed light in an interesting way on Merleau-Ponty.

These efforts will fall under the category ‘Primacy Of The Dimension Of Depth.’

Of course, I am far from having finished the other two main categories I have been working on in this blog, to wit: ‘The Argument That Tagalog Lacks A Subject’ (a thread inspired largely by Paz Buenaventura Naylor’s article), and ‘Material Implication And Information Theory’ (inspired largely by Fred Dretske’s KNOWLEDGE AND THE FLOW OF INFORMATION and by Edwin D. Mares’ RELEVANT LOGIC).  I intend to continue working on these threads at the same time that I am re-igniting an old flame, my crush on Merleau-Ponty.




If I bore anyone, tough.  You don’t have to read these incoherent/semi-incoherent ramblings.  I am writing largely in order to learn, to get as much clarity as I can in my own head regarding these topics.

Of course, it would be nice if someone else were interested in them, and, even better yet, had something useful and interesting to say about them, whether in disagreement or agreement with me.

It would also be nice if Ashton Kutcher gave me a call.




(No post even touching on philosophy would be completed without an homage to Plato’s SYMPOSIUM.)  I wonder if Alkibiades was as gorgeous.



Selectors And Semantic vs. Syntactic Arguments

In case anyone wonders (“feel free to come to the point when you finally decide what it is”), the point of the following ramblings is to arrive at a place where I can make a distinction between semantic arguments and syntactic arguments.  The point of making this distinction will become clear (or not) in a later post.  Making the distinction is part of my attempting to put in my own words the argument that Tagalog lacks a subject.

In the previous post, I argued (or claimed, or made the completely unsupported, nay, spurious assertion, as the case may be) that the semantics of Maganda si Robert Pattinson can also be given by the following statement in the database language Tutorial D:


This statement includes the Selector PERSON(NAME(‘Robert Pattinson’)).  Let me unpack a bit what this is. Before I start, I’d like to point out that I THINK that it is  legal in Tutorial D to nest one selector inside another…

NAME(‘Robert Pattinson’) is a operator or function that takes the string ‘Robert Pattinson’ and selects one and only one name.  I will take the concept ‘selects’ as primitive here.  Any implementation of this selector in a physical computer would involve shuffling around ones and zeros until the computer spits out, i.e., returns, one member of the set NAME.  NAME would include strings, but subject to certain limitations.  For example, I assume a  name would have to be, at least, less than 1 billion characters long.  NAME would also include more than strings (that is, representations of text):  a name can be selected by a sound.  So NAME(<<some representation of a sound>>) could also select the name Robert Pattinson. (The reader will notice that I have not yet decided on how to represent, in the absence of a formal selector, a name as opposed to a string as opposed to the person himself…)

PERSON(NAME(Robert Pattinson)) would take the name selected by NAME(‘Robert Pattinson’) and return a member of the set PERSONS, i.e., Robert Pattinson himself.  I don’t know how a computer would implement this operator, but a human being would be implementing that operator in the following type of circumstance:  say, I am sitting in a restaurant.  Someone in the table next to me says:

 I hereby officially declare myself to belong to Team Edward because Robert Pattinson is just too gorgeous.

One part of that utterance, the part that I hear as the word ‘Robert Pattinson’, is the end point of a long causal chain that begins, say, when the parents of Robert Pattinson, after endless wrangling and indecision, finally agree to call their baby ‘Robert’; the doctor in the Maternity Ward crosses out the ‘baby boy’ in ‘baby boy Pattinson’ and writes in  ‘Robert’ on the birth certificate (call this the ‘baptismal event’) … endless events … a director or producer chooses the person named by ‘Robert Pattinson’ to play Edward Cullen in TWILIGHT … endless events…the person sitting at the table next to me sees TWILIGHT…he reads in a magazine he buys at the supermarket that Robert Pattinson played the part of Edward Cullen…he emits a set of soundwaves at the table next to me, which in turn trigger God-only-knows what processes in my brain, until I hear ‘…Robert Pattinson….’  That entire causal chain, ending up in the wetware of my brain, selects the person Robert Pattinson.  THAT’s the implementation of the selector PERSON(NAME(<<some representation of certain sound waves>>)).  Speaking metaphorically and a bit picturesquely, the selector spits out, or returns, Robert Pattinson himself, the flesh-and-blood Robert Pattinson who lives in (I would say ‘Valencia, California’, but that is where Taylor Lautner lives)…. Speaking literally, the selector selects Robert Pattinson himself.

(See Saul Kripke, who apparently never explicitly endorsed this causal theory of reference aka selection.  Gareth Evans would apparently deem this theory, as stated by me, to be naive, but it seems perfectly intuitive to me.)

Invocations of selectors produce literals (more accurately, I guess, are literals).  So whatever else Robert Pattinson himself may be, he is a literal value.

Let me take the liberty of allowing selector invocations as arguments supplied to the parameters of functions, so that we can replace x with the argument PERSON(NAME(‘Robert Pattinson’)) in the function x EQUALS x to produce a true proposition.  Below, I have identified, ala Chisholm, propositions with states of affairs in the world:  here, with Robert Pattinson being identical with Robert Pattinson.  This proposition gives us the semantics of the utterance “Robert Pattinson equals Robert Pattinson.”

I will therefore call the invocation of PERSON(NAME(‘Robert Pattinson’)) a semantic argument.  By contrast, the invocation of NAME(‘Robert Pattinson’), occuring inside an utterance, spoken or written, is a syntactic argument.  In this way, I make sense of the semantic arguments vs. syntactic arguments distinction I puzzled over in a previous post.

I do not know, of course, whether this is the distinction that Beatrice Santorini wanted to make.

I will end by making another homage to Plato’s SYMPOSIUM, according to which interest in Robert Pattinson, Taylor Lautner, Kellan Lutz et al ultimately leads to interest in the Relational Algebra, and from there, to the Form of Beauty itself:


Wow, I love that slightly-unshaven look…(the reader may  hear a rapturous sigh…)

Now, having briefly lapsed into a lower form of eros, I will go back to eros for the Relational Algebra in connection with Semantics….

Update:  After hitting the publish button, I saw this quote from the first Jewish Prime Minister of Great Britain:

The best way to become acquainted with a subject is to write a book about it.

Benjamin Disraeli

Or blog about it at length.

Some Gorgeous One Equals Robert Pattinson

Below, I have argued that (or, more accurately, attempted to provoke the Aha Erlebniss that)  the following three Tagalog sentences:

Titser ang babae.

Maganda ang lalaki.

Umalis ang babae.

…have as their most literal translation something like the following:

Some teacher one  equals the woman.

Some gorgeous one equals the man.

Some having left one equals the woman.

How would these sentences be expressed in the Relational Algebra?  Let me try to express “Some beautiful one equals Robert Pattinson” (I am switching from Team Jacob to Team Edward for the moment) in the Relational Algebra.  (Notice I am switching from ‘the man’ to ‘Robert Pattinson’.  Can I get away with this?)

A relation is a set of ordered pairs formed by taking the Cartesian Product of two sets, not necessarily distinct, and obtaining a subset (possibly identical with the entire set) of the set of ordered pairs.  Let’s form a particular EQUALS relation, GORGEOUS_EQUALS_GORGEOUS, by taking the Cartesian Product of the set GORGEOUS with the set GORGEOUS, then take from that Product the set of all those ordered pairs in which each member of the pair is identical with the other.  So that the relation can be more easily manipulated (conceptually), add in all the stuff necessary to turn this relation into a database relation, complete with tuples and attributes and all that good stuff.

Robert Pattinson Robert Pattinson
Taylor Lautner Taylor Lautner
Kellan Lutz Kellan Lutz
Brad Pitt Brad Pitt
Ashton Kutchner Ashton Kutchner

Restrict GORGEOUS_EQUALS_GORGEOUS to just the Robert Pattinson tuple:

More attention needs to be paid to the literal selector PERSON(NAME(‘Robert Pattinson’)).  Will my worries about this, unarticulated here, eventually blow up in my face?

To get the relation pictured by:

Robert Pattinson Robert Pattinson

Now project on the attribute THAT_ONEi in addition to performing the RESTRICT:


To get the relation pictured by:

Robert Pattinson

(Imagine the surrounding white space as regnant with the matrix from which this relation sprints, namely, the base relation GORGEOUS_EQUALS_GORGEOUS.)

The above relation expresses the proposition that is also expressed in English as:

Some gorgeous one equals Robert Pattinson.

and that is also expressed in Tagalog, I claim, as:

Maganda si Robert Pattinson.


Maganda si Robert Pattinson.

Some gorgous one equals Robert Pattinson

have the same semantics.  (Well, would have the exact same semantics if ‘gorgeous’ were exactly equivalent to ‘maganda’, which of course may be doubtful.)

Now, in the spirit of Plato’s Symposium (eros for gorgeous  young men inspires eros for the Relational Algebra and the Predicate Logic, and from there to the Form of Beauty itself), let me picture some of the members of that set which inspires my forays into the Relational Algebra.  These pictures are a bit more colorful than the pictures of relations shown above.

Do I really have to choose between Team Edward and Team Jacob?

12/04/2012:  Updated to remove problematic assertions about the semantics of ‘is’.

The Relational Algebra Gives Us Something (Or Somebody, Or At Least Someone)

Now onto trying to show how the Relational Algebra gives us ‘something’, ‘somebody’, ‘someone’, and so on.

When I talk about database relations in the following, I am, unless I state otherwise, talking about the abstract object, not those relations concretely realized in an RDBMS.

A brief explanation of the Relational Algebra:  Posit a world all of whose people are members of the set {John, Cliff, Charles, Genghis Khan, Leon Trotsky}.  Moreover, suppose that currently, the predicate:

 x is standing to the left of y

generates the Database Relation pictured below when all the members of this set are substituted for the parameters x and y:

Charles Genghis Khan
Dan Leon Trotsky
Cliff Genghis Khan

(The above picture, by the way, is just that — a picture of the Relation.  It is not the Relation itself.)  As indicated by the number 0 in the name, this Relation is a base Relation, i.e., what we have before any operations are applied to it.

The Relational Algebraic operation RESTRICT is a function that takes the Relation pictured above as input and produces another Relation as output.  For example, the following RESTRICTion, expressed in Tutorial D:

TO_THE_LEFT_OF where PERSON_ON_THE_LEFT = ‘Charles’;  (Yes, I’ve suddenly gone from the flesh and blood Charles as member of a set to the name ‘Charles’; God only knows what confusions this sudden shift will introduce.)

generates the Relation pictured below:

Charles Genghis Khan
Dan Leon Trotsky
Cliff Genghis Khan

The operation RESTRICT has given us a Relation comprising a single proposition expressed by the sentence ‘Charles is standing to the left of Genghis Khan.’  As indicated by the number 1, this is a Derived Relation, produced as output from a function that took as input the Base Relation.  The charcoal-grayed out portions of the picture are meant to convey that the derived relation is tied to the base relation in a way in which I will discuss later.

As with RESTRICT, the Relational Algebraic operation PROJECT takes the Base Relation as input and generates a Derived Relation as output.  The following RESTRICT and PROJECT operations, expressed in Tutorial D:


generates the Relation pictured below:

Charles Genghis Khan
Dan Leon Trotsky
Cliff Genghis Khan

whose body is the set containing the tuple or proposition expressed by the sentence “Charles is to the left of somebody.”

But wait — all we see in this picture is the value Charles.  (Or, more precisely, the name ‘Charles’ appearing as a set of black pixels on a screen.)  Isn’t this a tuple in a one-place relation?  And if it is, wouldn’t it be a proposition belonging to one-place relation, a proposition such as “Charles laughs”, or “Charles runs”, or “Charles eats”?

Well, if it were such, it could be any proposition belonging to a one-place relation.  The only way to constrain which proposition this tuple is to just one proposition is to place it in its context, the source from which it is derived, i.e., the base relation TO_THE_LEFT_OF.  By performing the Projection, we are for the moment blacking-out the identity of Genghis Khan, the person to whom Charles is to the left, so that we can focus on the identity of Charles.  But we haven’t forgotten that we are working with the relation TO_THE_LEFT_OF, so we know that Charles is to the left of somebody.  We haven’t suddenly switched to the relations LAUGHS, or RUNS, or EATS.

To turn for the moment for relations concretely implemented in an RDBMS running in some stuff made out of the same substance as the red paint on the Golden Gate Bridge, complete chaos would ensue, the world would become a topsy-turvey place, objects would start falling up, if, say, a Projection on EMPLOYEE_NAME in the EMPLOYEE (select EMPLOYEE_NAME from EMPLOYEE) would result, not in the set of people employed by the company (more precisely, the set of propositions ‘John, employee of Widgets_R_US’, ‘Jesse, employee of Widgets_R_US’, and so on), but the set of people designated to live on Mars one moment, the set of ambassadors to Vietnam the next moment, and the set of of Pulitzer Prize winners the third moment.

So the meaning of a Projection on an attribute (“column”) of a relation is constrained by the relation from which it is standing out (“projecting”), so to speak.  The derived relation never ceases to, well, derive its meaning from the base relation.  It never ceases to be a derived relation.  Charles never ceases to be one member of a pair whose member on his right is being ignored or blacked-out for the moment.

(Compare this argument with C.J. Date’s argument in LOGIC AND DATABASES, pp. 387-391.)

Let’s trace then what happens, in this relational model, when we plug in Charles to replace x in the predicate:

Person x, to the left of somebody

The ‘somebody’ is not a parameter — no argument gets plugged into it — but it along with the x indicate that the base relation we are dealing with is TO_THE_LEFT_OF.  It tells us that one of the ‘central participants in the situation’ is some person to the right.  The relevant Relational Algebra Operations — the relevant RESTRICT and the relevant PROJECT — are then performed to generate the proposition:

Charles, to the left of somebody.

According to the Closed World Assumption, a Relation contains all and only those tuples — those propositions — those states of affairs — that obtain, and for which plugging in arguments to the parameters of the predicate defining the Relation results in a true sentence.  Therefore, each tuple in the Relation is paired with the truth value TRUE, and of course, within the Range comprising the two truth values, only the truth value TRUE.

So the set of tuples in a Relation and the set of Truth Values is a function.  So, finally — if I may end this string of ‘therefores’ and ‘so’s’ (“Feel free to come to the point when you finally decide what it is, I hear someone say”), when a single tuple is selected, as was done when the RESTRICT and PROJECT were performed on the Relation TO_THE_LEFT_OF, we can see this as the application of the function on that tuple, an application which returns TRUE.  So (this really is the final ‘so’ — I promise) plugging in the argument ‘Charles’ into the parameter x in the predicate:

x is to the left of somebody

triggers a RESTRICT and PROJECT on the Relation TO_THE_LEFT_OF, which in turn constitutes a selection of a single tuple in that relation, which in turn returns TRUE, which lets us regard the predicate as a function returning TRUE when ‘Charles’ is plugged into the parameter marked by x.

Just so, when the RESTRICT and PROJECT fail to select a tuple, as it does when we substitute ‘John’ for x (John is standing to the right of everyone else, including Genghis Khan), FALSE is returned.

Voila!  We now we have somebody (or, as the case may be, nobody).

It is clear that the predicate:

x is to the left of y

can be treated the same way.

Treating verbs aka predicates relationally this way — that is, as functions implemented by Relations and operations on Relations — has two advantages over simply seeing them as functions in the way described by Kroch and Santorini.  First, we get a semantics for ‘somebody’, ‘something’, etc.  Second, we have a way of conceptualizing in terms of operations of the Relational Algebra the select that occurs when, to use the verb laughs as our example, Luke is selected and the truth value TRUE is returned.  The notion of select is no longer a primitive.


Updated on 05/10/2012 to correct an obvious oversight.

Trying To Make The Problem A Bit Clearer

In the hopes of making it a bit clearer why it is a problem, let me restate the question that I think the Relational Algebra will resolve.

So far we have been modeling sentences in which nothing is left unspecified.  Chris invites AndrewLukas laughs.  How could we model, however, sentences such as Chris invited someone, Someone invited Andrew, Someone invited someone, Joe ate something, Someone laughed … sentences in which at least one of the “central participants in a situation” is left unspecified?

‘Somebody’, ‘someone’, ‘something’ and so on pose a problem for the model presented in the post The Verb Considered As A Function.  Sets always comprise definite, clear-cut individuals.  Since functions are sets of ordered pairs, the primary and recursive functions discussed so far are pairings of definite entities.  What would it mean anyway to have a function that included an indefinite or unknown, entity, as if some function could be pictured this way:
brackets instead.

(1)     [[ laugh ]] = {   T,
  Eva F,
  Lukas T,
  Tina T }


How would we model a sentence “Somebody laughed” that is true, and a corresponding sentence “Somebody laughed” that is false?


The Predicate As A Truth Valued Function

So far we have been modeling sentences in which nothing is left unspecified.  Chris invites AndrewLukas laughs.  How could we model, however, sentences such as Chris invited someone, Someone invited Andrew, Someone invited someone, Joe ate something, Someone laughed … sentences in which at least one of the “central participants in a situation” is left unspecified?  We can model these sentences, I think, by applying the Relational Algebra to them — or, more precisely, to the propositions that underlie them.  In this post, I start laying the groundwork for showing how we can use the Relational Algebra to model sentences containing ‘someone’, ‘anyone’, and the like.

Let me begin by outlining the key premise behind Relational Database Theory: 

Predicates generate propositions which are either true or false.  A given Database Relation comprises all and only the true propositions generated by a given predicate.  (This is the Closed World Assumption.)  We can apply various operations of the Relational Algebra to the propositions contained in a Database Relation.

The key premise in Relational Database Theory talks about predicates.  What, then, is a predicate?

What the database theorist C.J. Date calls a predicate is what Kroch and Santorini call, in the primer on Chomskyan linguistics quoted from in the post below (The Verb Considered As A Function) a verb.  Date explains what a predicate is better than I can, so let him speak (LOGIC AND DATABASES THE ROOTS OF RELATIONAL THEORY, Trafford Publishing, Canada, 2007, p. 11):

A predicate in logic is a truth valued function.

In other words, a predicate is a function that, when invoked, returns a truth value.  Like all functions, it has a set of parameters; when it’s invoked, arguments are substituted for the parameters; substituting arguments for the parameters effectively converts the predicate into a proposition; and we say the arguments satisfy the predicate if and only if that proposition is true.  For example, the argument the sun satisfies the predicate “x is a star,” while the argument the moon does not. 

Let’s look at another example:

x is further away than y

This predicate involves two parameters, x and y.  Substituting arguments the sun for x and the moon for y yields a true proposition; substituting arguments the moon for x and the sun for y yields a false one. 

The key premise mentions Database Relations.  What, then, is a Database Relation?

The concept of a Database Relation is an elaboration on the concept of a Relation as defined in mathematics.  In mathematics, a Relation is defined as the subset of the Cartesian Product of two or more sets.  (What a Cartesian Product is will be obvious from the example.)  For example, in the sets {John, Charles, Cliff, Dan} and {Leon Trotsky, Genghis Khan}, the Cartesian Product is { (John; Leon Trotsky), (John; Genghis Khan), (Charles; Leon Trotsky), (Charles; Genghis Khan), (Cliff; Leon Trotsky), (Cliff; Genghis Khan), (Dan; Leon Trotsky), (Dan; Genghis Khan)}.  If, now, we pick out a subset of this Cartesian Product by seeing who happens to be standing to the left of whom at the moment, we get this Relation:  { (Charles; Genghis Khan), (Cliff; Genghis Khan), (Dan; Leon Trotsky)}. 

In other words, our Relation is what we get when we start with the predicate:

x is standing to the left of y

and plug in values for x from the set {John, Charles, Cliff, Dan} and values for y {Leon Trotsky, Genghis Khan}, throw away all the false propositions that result, and keep all of the true propositions.

Let me go out on a limb, then, and say that a proposition (remember, our key premise mentions propositions) is a tuple, that is to say, an ordered pair (for example, (Charles, Genghis Khan) ) in a Relation.  (Please, pretty please, don’t saw this limb off.) 

This means then that a proposition is a state of affairs ala R.M. Chisholm.  For example, the proposition Charles is standing to the left of Genghis Khan is the state of affairs comprising the flesh and blood Charles standing to the left of the flesh and blood Genghis Khan.  Propositions as states of affairs are the meaning of sentences… But I digress.

Back to Relations. 

A Database Relation, I have said, is an elaboration of a Mathematical Relation.  A Database Relation comprises a Heading consisting of ordered pairs of (Name Of Type; Type) and a Body consisting in a set of ordered pairs (Name Of Type, Value).  A type is a set, for example, the set of integers, the set of words in a given language, the set of people, the set of cities in the world, and so on.  A value of a type is a member of the set identical with that type.  I will leave name undefined. 

A Database Relation is an abstract object;  it is either an object really existing in some Platonic Heaven someplace or it is a fiction, depending upon which theory of abstract objects is the correct one.  Database Relations form the conceptual skeleton of databases concretely implemented by an RDBMS (Relational Database Management System) functioning inside a physical computer, but at least at the moment I am not talking about physical computers and the software they run.  I am talking about the abstract object, something that has the same status as the number 3 or the isoceles triangle. 

Why do I want to talk about Database Relations rather than Mathematical Relations?  It will be easier in the  posts that (hopefully) will follow to illustrate the Relational Algebra operations Projection and Restriction.  I know how to apply these operations to Database Relations; I am not sure how to apply them to Relations simpliciter.   Projection and Restriction are the Relational Algebra operations which, I claim, will give us a model for sentences such as Joe ate something. 

I’ve laid the groundwork for such a model; now let me go on to produce the model.